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Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access published online on November 18, 2008
Cambridge Journal of Economics, doi:10.1093/cje/ben049
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Plural situational logic: the rationa(lisabi)lity principle

Celia Lessa Kerstenetzky*

* Economics Department, Federal Fluminense University, Rio de Janeiro

Address for correspondence: Economics Department, Federal Fluminense University, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; email: celiakersten{at}gmail.com

In the context of a critique of the exclusive use of the rational choice approach in economics, the article presents a pluralistic interpretation of the Popperian notion of situational logic as an alternative approach. This is proposed in connection with a reading of the rationality principle as a rationalisability principle. I argue that this principle can accommodate an ample array of rational responses to different situations and even rationalise the multiple responses that are given to the same situation. I present some examples to illustrate the relevance of the proposed interpretation.

Key Words: Rationality principle • Rationalisability principle • Popper • Rational choice • Situational logic

JEL classification: B41

Manuscript received April 16, 2007; final version received April 24, 2008.


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