Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access published online on December 6, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics, doi:10.1093/cje/bei097
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1 Ave Maria University, Naples, FL
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. This paper takes the unusual step of exploring economic hypotheses through interviews with key economic agents. It focuses on the causes of Ecuador's 1999 banking collapse, within an eclectic framework with Minskian elements. Broad support is found for endogenous explanations of financial crises and little backing for explanations such as accidents or policy mistakes. Interviewees argued that after the stabilisation programme of 1992, agents became euphoric and accumulated debt to finance imprudent levels of expansion; that incentives for moral hazard led to financial corruption and excessive risk taking; and that weak regulation after financial liberalisation encouraged financial fragility.
Received August 28, 2003
Revised May 23, 2005
Article
The political economy of the Ecuadorian financial crisis
Gabriel X. Martinez 1 *
Gabriel X. Martinez, E-mail: gmartinez{at}avemaria.edu
![]()
Abstract ![]()
CiteULike
Connotea
Del.icio.us What's this?