Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access published online on January 10, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics, doi:10.1093/cje/beh044
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1 Aston Business School, Aston University, UK
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on direction, that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of contractual theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm.
Received July 9, 2003
Article
On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm
James H. Love, E-mail: j.h.love{at}aston.ac.uk
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