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Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on June 1, 2007
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2009 33(5):903-920; doi:10.1093/cje/bem008
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Right arrow L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Right arrow L66 - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits
Right arrow O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Right arrow O55 - Africa
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© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

This article appears in the following Cambridge Journal of Economics issue: Special focus: Moral Economy and Development Economics [View the issue table of contents]

Market institutions, trust and norms: exploring moral economies in Nigerian food systems

Fergus Lyon* and Gina Porter*

* Middlesex University Business School and Durham University, respectively

Addresses for correspondence: Fergus Lyon, Centre for Enterprise and Economic Development Research, Middlesex University Business School, London NW4 4BT, UK; email: f.lyon{at}mdx.ac.uk; and Gina Porter, Department of Anthropology, Durham University, Durham DH1 3HN, UK

Informal market institutions and small-scale traders are responsible for feeding Nigerian cities. This study analyses a range of economic relationships and institutions that have evolved in the context of inadequate formal institutions such as banks and legal contracts. Through examining both personal relationships and institutional based trust, the paper explores the role of moral norms. Trust is shown to be related to sanctions, information on other parties and a range of norms that are drawn on both calculatively and habitually. The perceived moralities of different forms of institution (such as credit systems, trader associations and commission agents) are also examined.

Key Words: Trust • Norms • Morality • Institutions • Markets • Nigeria • Africa

JEL classifications: L14, L66, O17, O55

Manuscript received November 21, 2005; final version received September 15, 2006.


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