Skip Navigation


Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on January 10, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2006 30(1):123-135; doi:10.1093/cje/bei020
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
30/1/123    most recent
bei020v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Boylan, T. A.
Right arrow Articles by O'Gorman, P. F.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Notes and Comments

Fleetwood on causal holism: clarification and critique

Thomas A. Boylan* and Paschal F. O'Gorman

* National University of Ireland

Address for correspondence: Professor Thomas A. Boylan, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway, Galway, Ireland; email: thomas.boylan{at}nuigalway.ie

Abstract

Fleetwood (2002, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 26, no. 1, 27–45), provided a critical evaluation of causal holism (Boylan and O'Gorman, 1995, Ekonomia, vol. 1, no. 2, 9–21), from the perspective of critical realism. For Fleetwood there are three fundamental areas of disagreement, namely the differential approaches to unobservable entities, description, and explanation. In this paper the authors dispute Fleetwood's analysis of causal holism in all these areas. To contextualise and clarify their disagreements with Fleetwood, the authors examine the most significant differences between the two methodological frameworks. They argue that notwithstanding their shared criticism of mainstream economics, critical realism and causal holism remain methodologically incompatible.

Key Words: Causal holism • Constrastive explanation • Critical realism • Description • Models

JEL classifications: B41, B49

Manuscript received January 6, 2003; final version received June 28, 2004.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.