Skip Navigation

Cambridge Journal of Economics 2009 33(4):829-869; doi:10.1093/cje/bep037
This Article
Right arrow Full Text Freely available
Right arrow FREE Full Text (PDF) Freely available
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Palma, J. G.
Related Collections
Right arrow E22 - Capital; Investment; Capacity
Right arrow E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
Right arrow F02 - International Economic Order
Right arrow F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Right arrow F59 - International Relations and International Political Economy: Other
Right arrow G20 - General
Right arrow G30 - General
Right arrow N20 - General, International, or Comparative
Right arrow O16 - Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Right arrow O43 - Institutions and Growth
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

This article appears in the following Cambridge Journal of Economics issue: Special Issue: The Global Financial Crisis [View the issue table of contents]

The revenge of the market on the rentiers.

Why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

José Gabriel Palma*

* University of Cambridge, UK

Address for correspondence: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, UK; email: jgp5{at}cam.ac.uk

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian–Minskyian–Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of appropriate regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. In particular, into a system without ‘compulsions’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while doing the opposite to workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies—including many economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end, the crisis materialised when markets took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Key Words: Ideology • Neo-liberalism • Foucault • Causes of financial crisis • Investment • Risk • Income distribution • Rent-seeking

JEL classifications: E22, E24, F02, F36, F59, G20, G30, N20, O16, O43

Manuscript received April 2, 2009; final version received June 9, 2009.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Cambridge J EconHome page
R. Wade
From global imbalances to global reorganisations
Camb. J. Econ., July 1, 2009; 33(4): 539 - 562.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Home page
Cambridge J EconHome page
S. Blankenburg and J. G. Palma
Introduction: the global financial crisis
Camb. J. Econ., July 1, 2009; 33(4): 531 - 538.
[Full Text] [PDF]



Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.