Skip Navigation


Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on April 9, 2008
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2008 32(5):739-759; doi:10.1093/cje/ben007
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
32/5/739    most recent
ben007v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Arza, V.
Right arrow Articles by Español, P.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow C23 - Models with Panel Data
Right arrow D21 - Firm Behavior
Right arrow O16 - Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Right arrow O54 - Latin America; Caribbean
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Les Liaisons dangereuses: a Minskyan approach to the relation of credit and investment in Argentina during the 1990s

Valeria Arza and Paula Español*

* CONICET – CENIT and EHESS-CEP, respectively, Buenos Aires

Address for correspondence: Valeria Arza, CONICET – CENIT, Callao 796 6to piso CP: 1023, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina; email: varza{at}fund-cenit.org.ar. Paula Español, EHESS-CEP, Av. Julio A. Roca 651—5°, sect. 22, (C1067AAB) Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina; email: pespan{at}mecon.gov.ar

We classify firms according to their financial behaviour in the short term using a Minskyan taxonomy that classifies firms as Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi. We measure financial constraints across that taxonomy using panel-data for Argentina during 1992–2001. After controlling for profitability we find that firms with an oppressed financial structure in the short term had to rely on their internal funds for long-term investment. We interpret this finding from a Minskyan/Keynesian framework arguing that credit allocation followed conventional rules about the quality of borrowers and not necessarily about the quality of the project. Because of being a highly unstable country, Argentinean firms’ quality is defined on a short-term basis.

Key Words: Minsky • speculation • investment • finance • firm behaviour • Argentina

JEL classifications: C23, D21, O16, O54

Manuscript received April 1, 2005; final version received January 31, 2008.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.