Skip Navigation


Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on October 12, 2007
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2007 31(6):901-925; doi:10.1093/cje/bem025
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
31/6/901    most recent
bem025v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Rutledge, I.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

New Labour, energy policy and ‘competitive markets’

Ian Rutledge*

* Partner in Sheffield Energy & Resources Information Services (SERIS; www.seris.co.uk). He previously taught on the Energy Studies/Energy Business MA/MSc Program at Sheffield University and the Sheffield University Division of Continuing Education Derbyshire Miners' Day Release Program

Address for correspondence: 19 Fairfield Road, Chesterfield S40 4TR, UK; email: idr{at}seris.co.uk.

By the end of New Labour's first term four central objectives of energy policy had become established: ‘cheap’ energy, the relief of fuel poverty, a major reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, and energy security through maintaining a wide diversity of primary fuel supplies, all to be achieved through ‘competition’. After surveying New Labour energy policy documents, the paper argues that New Labour failed to appreciate (i) the extent to which, under such a laissez faire policy regime, these objectives were mutually inconsistent; (ii) that the apparent successes of energy market liberalisation during the preceding Conservative Governments had little to do with ‘competition’; and (iii) that the transaction costs of injecting increasing ‘competition’ into both British and European energy systems are likely to exacerbate the growing threat to energy security. The paper concludes with a brief examination of the implications of transaction cost economics for the organisational structure of the UK energy supply industry.

Key Words: Energy policy • Energy security • Competition • Nuclear power

JEL classifications: L14, L97, L98, Q42, Q48

Manuscript received January 8, 2007; final version received June 26, 2007.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Cambridge J EconHome page
M. Kitson and F. Wilkinson
The economics of New Labour: policy and performance
Camb. J. Econ., November 1, 2007; 31(6): 805 - 816.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.