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Cambridge Journal of Economics 2006 30(6):981-984; doi:10.1093/cje/bel025
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Right arrow B51 - Socialist; Marxian; Sraffian
Right arrow H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
Right arrow J26 - Retirement; Retirement Policies
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© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Notes and Comments

Comments on Cesaratto's ‘Transition to fully funded pension schemes: a non-orthodox criticism’

Thomas R. Michl*

* Colgate University

Address for correspondence: Colgate University, Hamilton, NY 13346, USA; email: tmichl{at}mail.colgate.edu

Abstract

Cesaratto's critique of the neoclassical approach to pension reform is valuable, but he has overextended his argument in applying it to proposals to use pre-funding as a mechanism for achieving greater public ownership and for redistributing wealth progressively. The fiscal surpluses needed to pre-fund the public pension system could increase investment, provided that they are offset by an appropriately stimulating monetary policy. The post-Keynesian investment literature descending from Kalecki's principle of increasing risk motivates on non-neoclassical grounds the interest sensitivity of investment required to make this policy mix effective.

Key Words: Social security • Pensions • Pre-funding • Post-Keynesian theory

JEL classifications: H55, J26, J32, B51

Manuscript received March 6, 2006; final version received June 13, 2006.


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S. Cesaratto
A reply to Michl
Camb. J. Econ., November 1, 2006; 30(6): 985 - 987.
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