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Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on August 22, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2006 30(3):321-345; doi:10.1093/cje/bei062
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Article

William James's psychological pragmatism: habit, belief and purposive human behaviour

Michael S. Lawlor*

* Wake Forest University

Address for correspondence: Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Box 7505, Winston-Salem, NC, 27109 USA; email: lawlor{at}wfu.edu

Abstract

Modern institutional economists look to pragmatism for: (1) an evolutionary philosophy of knowledge; and (2) a foundation of a theory of human nature. These two elements are combined in William James, who was both a philosopher of pragmatism and a pioneering experimental psychologist. The author shows first how William James added psychological depth to the pragmatic tradition as it was left by C. S. Peirce, and offers a reconciliation of their respective theories of truth. The second part of the essay explores James's views on psychology, concentrating on the relation to pragmatic philosophy and the question of habit. The last section compares this to human nature as seen in modern evolutionary biology, in brain science and in the philosophy of rationality in the social sciences.

Key Words: William James • Psychology • Institutional economics • Pragmatism • Neuroscience

JEL classifications: A12, B25, B52, B4

Manuscript received July 30, 2001; final version received December 8, 2004.


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