Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on July 4, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2006 30(1):49-68; doi:10.1093/cje/bei048
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Article |
Post-Keynesianism, socialisation of investment and Swedish wage-earner funds
* University of Central Lancashire
Address for correspondence: Department of Information and Finance, Lancashire Business School, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE, UK; email: pbwhyman{at}uclan.ac.uk
Abstract
This paper analyses the performance of one of the most controversial of recent economic policy experiments, namely Swedish Wage-earner Funds (WEFs). It examines the ability of the WEFs to meet macroeconomic, financial and democratic objectives. The analysis indicates a favourable financial performance, but little significant democratisation. Macroeconomic influence was constrained by the limited size of the scheme and, though associated with positive changes in economic variables, the experiment was ultimately overwhelmed by the collapse of an asset price bubble. Nevertheless, the performance of the WEFs has legitimised the concept of collective investment funds as an economic policy instrument.
Key Words: Post-Keynesian economics Socialisation of investment Wage-earner Funds Swedish economy Economic democracy
JEL classifications: E6, G0, J5, P5
Manuscript received November 3, 2003; final version received May 4, 2004.