Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on January 10, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2005 29(5):709-727; doi:10.1093/cje/bei023
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Is there redemption for conventions?
* Department of History and Philosophy of Science and King's College, University of Cambridge
Address for correspondence: John Latsis, Flat 98, New River Head, 173 Rosebery Avenue, London EC1R 4UP, UK; email: johnplus{at}sete.ch.
This article explores the concept of convention in the social sciences. It presents the two major neo-Humean philosophical approaches to convention and challenges their intuitive appeal and research implications. The weaknesses of these approaches are examined and a new direction is suggested for the study of convention. The paper goes on to develop a framework for the analysis of conventions, using the notion of the exemplar introduced by Thomas Kuhn. An illustration of this alternative approach is provided using the example of the wage relation.
Key Words: Convention Hume Marx Game theory
JEL classifications: B10, B14, B41, C71
Manuscript received July 7, 2003; final version received April 23, 2004.