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Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access originally published online on January 10, 2005
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2005 29(4):559-576; doi:10.1093/cje/bei010
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Right arrow D20 - General
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Puzzles in the economic institutions of capitalism: production coordination, contracting and work organisation in the Irish linen trade, 1750–1850

Graham Brownlow and Frank Geary*

* University of East Anglia and University of Ulster at Jordanstown, respectively

Address for correspondence: Frank Geary, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ulster at Jordanstown, Shore Road, Newtownabbey BT37 0QB; email F.Geary{at}ulster.ac.uk.

Pre-Famine Ireland is a byword for market failure and path dependence. Production of flax yarn and linen cloth was highly regulated and coordinated by the market rather than by firms. Contemporary political economists suggested that these institutional features provided evidence of organisational inefficiency. The historical evidence suggests that they were a rational response to transaction and production costs. The Irish case provides a test of the hypotheses that firms emerge to reduce the cost of market transactions. It suggests that institutions other than the firm can modify transaction costs, coordination of production can affect both transaction and production costs, and that agents choose between market and firm coordination given technology and factor prices. Finally, centralisation of production was driven by technology.

Key Words: Production • Coordination • Markets • Firms • Transactions

JEL classifications: D2, N6, N9, O1

Manuscript received July 11, 2003; final version received April 30, 2004.


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