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Cambridge Journal of Economics 27:145-157 (2003)
Copyright © 2003 Cambridge Political Economy Society
Article |
Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy
Staffordshire University Business School.
Address for correspondence: Nick Adnett, Economics Division, Staffordshire University Business School, Leek Road, Stoke-on-Trent ST4 2DF, UK; email: n.j.adnett{at}staffs.ac.uk
Abstract
We examine the economic rationale for the expansion of incentive pay for school-teachers in England and Wales. While incentive pay usually improves performance in terms of targeted output, research also suggests that dysfunctional behaviour is likely, particularly in occupations with multiple goals such as teaching. We develop an economic analysis of the threat to collegiate ethos argument of those opposing increased use of incentive pay. This analysis suggests that the presence of asymmetric information, externalities and teamwork effects can provide a rationale for encouraging professional motivation.
Key Words: Teachers' pay Incentive pay Professional labour markets
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