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Cambridge Journal of Economics 26:739-751 (2002)
Copyright © 2002 Cambridge Political Economy Society
Article |
Some problems with the conception of the human subject in critical realism
St Catherine's College and the Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge University.
Address for correspondence: Philip Faulkner, Department of Applied Economics, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DE, UK; email p.faulkner{at}econ.cam.ac.uk
Abstract
The human subject plays a central role in the theory of social reality developed by Tony Lawson in his book Economics and Reality. This theory relies on an account of human cognitive functioning that distinguishes discursive from tacit knowledge. The present paper argues that Lawson's discussion of tacit knowledge in Economics and Reality is underdeveloped in that it leaves unexplored the notion of internalised knowledge. John Searle's work on mind, intentionality and the Background is reviewed and proposed as a solution to this problem.
Key Words: Tacit knowledge Critical realism Searle Intentionality Background