Skip Navigation

This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (1)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Beed, C.
Right arrow Articles by Beed, C.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Related Collections
Right arrow A10 - General
Right arrow B40 - General
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Cambridge Journal of Economics 24:417-435 (2000)
Copyright © 2000 Cambridge Political Economy Society

Article

The status of economics as a naturalistic social science

C Beedz and C Beed

136 Rathmines Road, Hawthorn East, Victoria 3123, Australia
z Corresponding author
E-mail: cncbeed@netspace.net.au

Abstract

Naturalistic social science is held frequently to be the most effective means of discovering social reality (e.g., Kincaid, H. 1996. Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in Social Research, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; McIntyre, L. 1996. Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences, Boulder, CO, Westview). This paper evaluates economics as such a science. From Kincaid (1996), criteria for naturalism in social science are identified. The focus here is whether rational, objective empirical methods exist for choosing economic theories; whether fair, cross and independent tests exist for theories, assumptions and methodological norms; and whether economic theories chosen in these ways have public policy relevance. Examples from economics are related to each of these naturalistic criteria. These encompass the relevance of econometrics to testing economic theories, the complications the non-natural-kind quality of economic variables impose on testing, and the question of whether naturalistic methods reveal economic reality. The paper concludes that the practice of economics does not, and is not able to, rely on naturalistic methods.

Key Words: naturalism • testing • prediction • innovation • policy


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.